<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><ncx version="2005-1" xmlns="http://www.daisy.org/z3986/2005/ncx/"><head><meta content="978-3-95857-095-5" name="dtb:uid"/><meta content="-1" name="dtb:depth"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:totalPageCount"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:maxPageNumber"/></head><docTitle><text>Feelings as Evaluative Indicators—A Reply to Iuliia Pliushch</text></docTitle><navMap><navPoint id="pt01html" playOrder="1"><navLabel><text>1 Use of the term “affect”</text></navLabel><content src="pt01.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt02html" playOrder="2"><navLabel><text>2 Causal information: Explicit versus implicit</text></navLabel><content src="pt02.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt03html" playOrder="3"><navLabel><text>3 Phenomenology of feelings: Background or foreground?</text></navLabel><content src="pt03.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt04html" playOrder="4"><navLabel><text>4 Directedness</text></navLabel><content src="pt04.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt05html" playOrder="5"><navLabel><text>5 What are the relations between feelings and conceptual representations?</text></navLabel><content src="pt05.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt06html" playOrder="6"><navLabel><text>6 Serial versus dynamic properties of cognitive processes</text></navLabel><content src="pt06.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt07html" playOrder="7"><navLabel><text>7 Self-deception and metacognition</text></navLabel><content src="pt07.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt08html" playOrder="8"><navLabel><text>8 Serial versus dynamic properties of cognitive processes</text></navLabel><content src="pt08.html"/></navPoint></navMap></ncx>