As noted in the title of an article by Koriat el al. (2006), the relations between control and monitoring in the production of metacognitive feelings are very "intricate". Iuliia Pliushch’s insightful comments have initiated what I hope to be a useful clarification of another aspect of feelings (whether metacognitive or not): their relations with propositional thoughts. Feelings elicited by tasks that are conceptually characterized do not become ipso facto conceptually penetrable: this difficult, unintuitive claim is often misunderstood and resisted for wrong reasons, which does not mean that it would resist any reason! The objection related to serialism was odd, given my own interest in the dynamic properties of the mental processes as offering a source of information that stable propositional properties of mental contents cannot provide. Once prediction and post-evaluation are identified as two major functions in metacognition, it is indeed important to emphasize that metacognitive processes of each kind are dynamic, and rely on various types of re-afferent feedback. Epistemic decisions, however, once made, are discontinuous by design, which turns the pre-decisional confidence level into a final evaluation that triggers or inhibits the corresponding action. Hence, a contrast must be maintained between how to select a goal and determine the level of effort needed to achieve it (i.e., a control command), on the one hand, and monitoring progress toward the goal, on the other hand. Each form of metacognition elicits feelings. This does not mean that the two functions need to be serially executed: for long, effortful tasks, agents need to frequently revise their level of effort and of success expectancy, by monitoring over time their progress through associated heuristics and feelings.