Embodied Simulation: A Paradigm for the Constitution of Self and Others

The main criticism Pfeiffer advances in his commentary is that our proposal is too narrow. Embodied simulation (ES), in his view equated to motor resonance, is not a sufficiently primary mechanism on which we can base a unified neurobiological theory of the earliest sense of self and others. According to Pfeiffer, motor resonance needs to be complemented by other more basic and primary mechanisms. Hence, as an alternative to our proposal, he suggests that multisensory spatial processing can play this role, primarily contributing to the earliest foundation of the sense of self and others. In our reply we stress on the one hand that identifying ES only with motor resonance is a partial view that may give rise to fallacious arguments, since ES also deals with emotions and sensations. We also show, on the other hand, that ES and multisensory integration should not be seen as alternative solutions to the problem of the neural bases of the bodily self, because multimodal integration carried out by the cortical motor system is an instantiation of ES. We conclude by stressing the role ES might have played in the transition from bodily experience to symbolic expression.