Does Resemblance Really Matter?

In this commentary on Gerard O’Brien’s “How does mind matter?—Solving the content causation problem”, I will investigate the notion of representational content presented in the latter. With this notion, O’Brien aims at giving an explanation of how mind matters in physicalist terms. His argumentation is motivated by, and supposedly directed towards, a problem he calls the content causation problem. Regarding this, I am most interested in reconstructing how his account relates to the presuppositions that make this problem so pressing in philosophical enquiry. O’Brien provides a very interesting answer to the question of “why mental content matters”, as motivated by the content causation problem. In particular, I will try to show that by making use of the notion of dispositions, it provides an interesting way of avoiding the presupposition that understanding content causation always requires the reduction of individual relational properties to individual intrinsic properties—probably because it is presupposed that such a reduction is impossible.