Here I have argued that Davidson's arguments that nonlinguistic creatures lack thought are either unsound or invalid. While this negative project does not allow us to conclude that they have propositional attitudes or thoughts, it makes room for positive arguments that will take advantage of recent and future empirical work on animal cognition and on the nature of nonlinguistic representations and their role in cognitive processing, as well as for novel negative arguments that might set limits on the capacities of nonlinguistic creatures. Much current research in animal cognition focuses on whether animals have theory of mind paralleling that of humans (Marticorena et al. 2011), or metacognition (Bermúdez 2003; Carruthers 2008; Lurz 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Proust 2010). One might therefore think that the debate has not progressed much since Davidson asked the question about whether animals can have a concept of belief. But Davidson’s interest in these questions was narrow, driven by his interpretationism and the view that these states are necessary for being an interpreter and thus for possessing mental content. In contrast, contemporary research does not aim to disprove the existence of propositional attitudes, but rather to elucidate the scope of these attitudes and understanding the ways in which they may be limited by limitations in representational resources. In the most exciting work, the philosophical and psychological projects come together. This interdisciplinary approach takes seriously evolutionary relationships and has a more nuanced view of the human being’s place among other animals. The arguments that result will be of great interest to philosophers of language and mind, as well as to those interested in ethical issues that transcend academia. And while they may vindicate a certain kind of human exceptionalism, they may also articulate our place on a spectrum that will ultimately lead to a more integrated and humane picture of our place in the world.