2 Different myths about conscious intentions

According to Bratman’s pragmatic teleological creation myth (1987), intentions are future-directed action plans, offering humans the capacity to “become temporally extended agents” (Pacherie this collection, p. 3). By forming an intention, which is inert and stable, we are able to predict the future and our future planning and form the basis for further intentions. Pacherie criticizes the future-directedness of conscious intentions and says that the pragmatic account of Bratman is incomplete, as it leaves non-pragmatic and present-directed intentions out of sight. Answering to the non-pragmatic function of conscious intentions, Anscombe’s teleological creation myth is (1963). Anscombe (1963) gives the whole debate about conscious intentions a highly interesting epistemic turn; her idea of conscious intentions is that they “provide us with a special kind of self-knowledge” (Pacherie this collection, p. 5). Her view of conscious intentions is that they provide immediate knowledge of our intentional actions as they provide an immediate non-observational and direct access to the content of our intention. Velleman’s myth about the function of conscious intentions is different (2007). He proposes that conscious intentions are a spandrel and do not have a teleological function on their own, they are a mere “accidental by-product” (Pacherie this collection, p. 6) of two features of human nature: curiosity and self-awareness. From these features arises the concept of intentions that allows human individuals to understand their actions in the world. Pacherie argues that Velleman’s approach only shifts the problem of the function of conscious intentions to the function of curiosity and self-awareness.

Pacherie’s suggestion is an approach based on empirical knowledge and conceptual considerations about motor cognition. The central element is the suggestion that conscious intentions have a function in motor control. She proposes a three-step hierarchical concept of generation and control of motor actions, developed elsewhere (Pacherie2008). Motor actions are controlled in an inverse and forward model, comparing error signals on different levels with each other. On the highest level I-Intentions are formed, referring to an abstract goal. These I-intentions allow for the selection of a fitting motor programme, the P-intention. Based on the P-intention the action underlies an online motor control via the M-Intention.

Figure 1: Pacherie’s model of intentional action.

Although providing evidence for unconscious motor control on the lowest level, Pacherie argues that a control function of intentions cannot be denied and remains a “central function of intentions” (this collection, p. 9), mainly on the highest level. Unconscious corrections are sufficient for small misalignments on the lowest level, whereas conscious intentions are necessary in the case of large misalignment between the different levels of motor control. Pacherie declares that “[i]n such case[es] of large misalignment, error signals would propagate upwards, we would become aware of them, and would shift to a conscious, intentional compensation strategy” (this collection, p. 10). Pacherie also offers a new definition of intentions. She thinks

of monitoring and control processes as intrinsic to intentions, that is, of intentions as encompassing not just representations of goals but also as a specific set of monitoring and control processes, organizing and structuring motor processes that themselves generate movements. (Pacherie this collection, p. 10)

To summarize, one can understand Pacherie’s conscious intentions as having a causal function.

One step further Pacherie suggests that conscious intentions have a coordinative and communicative function in joint action on the basis of her idea that they arise through a hierarchical action control mechanism. Joint action between humans needs a common goal, and success of the joint action is based on our capacity to coordinate actions and share goals, and also to correct and control the individual actions according to the co-agent’s actions. Shared actions can, in analogy to the hierarchical model of individual motor control, be controlled on a subconscious low-level. In planned action, however, a hierarchical high level of motor control is needed with which agents represent other’s actions and control their own actions according to a shared goal. Mechanisms for joint action discussed in recent empirical science focus on a perceptual framework with joint attention and allocentric spatial orientation (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007; Böckler et al. 2011 cited from Pacherie this collection). The question however, is whether this perceptual information is sufficient for successful joint action. Pacherie concludes that the conscious intention is necessary to control intra-individual and inter-individual alignment of actions. One major aspect in joint action is communication of joint goals—so the conscious intentions help us to communicate our intentions to others and the other way round, to receive information about the intention of others and to represent them. The influence of other’s intentions then guides our own intentions and the following actions.

After this overview over the different creation myths, we should think about the concept of a “myth” itself. A myth in general tries to find an explanation for a phenomenon that we cannot entirely understand. There seems to be a missing piece of knowledge, a gap, which is filled with an idea—the myth. Defining characteristics of a myth since ancient philosophy are its narrative or descriptive character, without being completely irrational. A myth in Plato’s sense can neither be falsified nor empirically verified (Partenie 2014). So a myth offers a possible explanation about a phenomenon, without making a claim about truth and without offering a potential empirical approach to the content of the myth. A creation myth about specific functions of conscious intentions is developed, as they seem so unquestionable in our everyday life, and nevertheless, we do not understand, why we have them. The myth—however—does not necessarily need to fit the rules of the physical world.

The social creation myth endows conscious intentions with the important function of a structuring and organizing part in motor action. To my mind, Pacherie develops even more than a myth. The above mentioned characteristics of a myth do not fit Pacherie’s empirically based approach. She wants to understand and explain the function of conscious intentions, and her myth wants to prepare us for such a deeper understanding. That is an important step, yet it brings certain difficulties. An explanation has to fit into the framework of current scientific knowledge. Most creation myths and most explanation myths make some implicit or explicit assumptions about the nature of conscious intentions, so do the above-described myths. To make full use of Pacherie’s contribution, we now should begin by adding constraints. Pacherie herself knows these limitations and discusses some of them in her recent paper (2014). What I want to add is a step-by-step-comparison of the empirical and analytical, metaphysical constraints and her hierarchical model in the following sections.