<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><ncx version="2005-1" xmlns="http://www.daisy.org/z3986/2005/ncx/"><head><meta content="978-3-95857-068-9" name="dtb:uid"/><meta content="-1" name="dtb:depth"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:totalPageCount"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:maxPageNumber"/></head><docTitle><text>Conceptualizing Metaethics-A Commentary on Jesse Prinz</text></docTitle><navMap><navPoint id="pt01html" playOrder="1"><navLabel><text>1 Metaethics under empirical scrutiny</text></navLabel><content src="pt01.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt02html" playOrder="2"><navLabel><text>2 Internalism and modal strength</text></navLabel><content src="pt02.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt03html" playOrder="3"><navLabel><text>3 Defending non-cognitivism as an empirical theory</text></navLabel><content src="pt03.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt04html" playOrder="4"><navLabel><text>4 Conclusion</text></navLabel><content src="pt04.html"/></navPoint></navMap></ncx>