[1]
He contrasts this with metaphysical naturalism and semantic naturalism. The former says that everything there is belongs to the natural world. The latter tries to reduce concepts from various domains in terms that are more likely to be naturalized in the metaphysical sense.
[2]
Although he doesn’t explicitly put it like this, I think it’s safe to frame it in this way. The option that denies affect-ladeness is called “externalist moral realism”, and he states in various places that emotions are motivating or action-guiding (Prinz this collection, pp. 8, 11, 21). And one answer to the third question is a position called “internal realism”. What I say about internalism in the following therefore applies equally to Prinz’s sentimentalism. See also Prinz (2006), where he explicitly states motivational internalism.
[3]
See Björklund et al. (2012) for a short overview.
[4]
Her critique is directed at internalism, not sentimentalism. But I regard both positions as similar enough to treat Roskies’s critique as an argument against Prinz’s sentimentalism (see also above). At the core of both positions is the connection between moral judgments and affective (motivational) states.
[5]
For this proposal see Björnsson & Francén Olinder (2013) and Bedke (2009) and Schulte (2012). They detail the idea that we can think of this relation as teleo-functionalistic.
[6]
Stevenson (1937, p. 25) writes: “I do like this; do so as well!” But the first part looks suspiciously descriptive. Because this doesn’t fit with Stevenson’s account, I reformulated it in this way.
[7]
Mackie discusses this instrumental use when he discusses why people give their moral judgments the appeal of objectivity (1990, p. 42). But as we saw, Prinz thinks this premise is wrong.