[1]
A possible objection to the Magic Eye stereogram as an illustration of a shifting perspective is that it can be enabled merely by a musculature action (the crossing of the eyes). One reviewer suggested that the new representation that emerges from these images may be no “more interesting than the muscular action of opening a closed eye which also allows the appearance of a suddenly unseen picture.” While a worthwhile observation, I do not think it challenges the relevance of the example. First, closing one’s eyes is not a different vantage of an image; it is a lack of a vantage at all. Second, like other reversible images whose shifting interpretation can be enhanced by movement of the eyes, the muscular adaptations required for seeing the alternate image of a Magic Eye stereogram is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its reinterpretation. This is illustrated by the fact that many people, despite all efforts of eye crossing, are incapable of entering them and that those who do have the good fortune to be of being able to experience them typically must engage in sustained cognitive effort to unpack the image once they begin to get into them. The central point of the Magic Eye example is that it illustrates how changing vantages on what one is looking at can profoundly influence what one believes to be true about it. The fact that this changing vantage may require a little eye crossing does not, in my view, lessen this observation.
[2]
In the past (Schooler & Schreiber 2004) I characterized Dennett as dismissing the notion of underlying experience altogether, noting that he has written “Nobody is conscious… we are all zombies” (Dennett 1993, p. 406). Although I still find his views on this issue somewhat slippery, I now believe that he endorses the existence of genuine phenomenal experience that can be validated with third- person evidence. For example Dennett (2003) argues that evidence about briefly presented stimuli could help to inform subjects about their actual conscious experience observing “Subjects would learn for the first time that they were, or were not, conscious of these stimuli” (p. 9).
[3]
Let’s just assume, for the sake of argument, that the aliens had solved the tricky issue of moving from logical to nomological possibility, that is that if it is possible for a philosophical zombie to exist in any conceivable universe, that it would be possible for you to become one.
[4]
An illusory experience being defined as an experience that does not correspond to actual reality, such as a hallucination. Note that a philosophical zombie does not have an illusory experience of being conscious, it has no experience at all.
[5]
Another possible way of reconciling the challenges of the flow of time and the present is to discard the notion of the block universe. While this vantage is the prevailing view in physics (Greene 2004), some have suggested that it needs revising (Hunt 2014; Smolin 2013).
[6]

Although subjective agents may move in subjective time relative to objective time in varying sized steps, it does not appear that there is necessarily a single temporal grain size for the processing of all sensory stimuli. Specifically, Pöppel (1997) finds that the duration of what constitutes a single moment (as assessed by temporal discrimination of successive sensory events) varies between sensory modalities. This observation seems potentially consistent with the suggestion that even within a single individual there may be multiple distinct conscious systems (Schooler et al. 2011; Zeki 2003) corresponding to different sensory levels and systems.

[7]
Several years ago, I presented the idea that consciousness entails movement through a subjective dimension of time using the depiction in Figure 15 and illustrated at the site: http://open-mind.net/videomaterials/schooler-bottles-loaf-1.mp4/view. One of the attendees, Robert Forman (see his description of the event, Forman 2008), suggested that although he was intrigued by my depiction, that it did not square with his intuitions. In my model, the block universe is fixed and consciousness marches through it. He suggested that his intuition was the opposite: namely that the field of the observer remains fixed and time passes by, or changes within it. This alternative vantage in which time evolves through a fixed observer seems a worthy alternative perspective for conceptualizing the ever -changing now that may be closer to approximating several other neutral monist vantages (e.g., Whitehead 1929, and Hunt 2014). While I think this alternative viewpoint is worthy of consideration, I also think it is likely that the two vantages are logically equivalent—it is simply a question of which one is taken as the fixed frame of reference. Nevertheless the manner in which we construe the movement of time relative to the individual may have important psychological consequences (Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008).
[8]
Although not a mathematician it seems plausible to me that existing mathematical formalisms might be adopted to accommodate some of the present conjectures. Most speculatively, a quantitative characterization of additional dimensions of time might correspond in some manner to the many worlds account of quantum mechanics (Everett 1957) that postulates that every potential alternative outcome of quantum events entails a different branching parallel universe. It strikes me as possible that these so called “many worlds” could correspond to different coordinates in additional temporal dimensions. From this vantage, the block universe might be better conceived of as a block multiverse, with innumerable distinct temporal projections. Several multi-dimensional theories of objective time might (e.g., Bars et al. 1998; Craig & Weinstein 2008) also be relevant. Also potentially pertinent are various existing quantitative efforts to reconcile experience and physical matter. For example, the magnitude of a conscious observer’s extension in subjective time might correspond to Tononi’s (2008) quantitative assessment of Φ (pronounced “fi”) which he characterizes as corresponding to the amount of integrated information that a conscious observer apprehends at any particular moment. Other potentially relevant formal approaches for reconciling consciousness with physical matter include: Hameroff & Penrose’s (2014) efforts to explain how consciousness may “consists of a sequence of discrete events, each being a moment of ‘objective reduction’ (OR) of a quantum state” (p. 73), and Tegmark’s (2014) suggestion that “consciousness can be understood as a state of matter, ‘perceptronium’, with distinctive information processing abilities” (p. 1). The relevance of these various approaches is highly speculative, and indeed given their disparities it is unlikely that they could be mutually accommodated. My point in mentioning them is simply to point the way towards some more formal approaches that might hold potential for advancing this discussion.