The keyword-based search of the abstract and title of Churchland’s publication reveals that it can be assimilated to the subject category or topic prototype Moral Theory, that is, a subject category or topic prototype that comprises publications on the psychology and neurobiology of moral-decision making, publications on determinism, free-will, and the function of moral theory in the neurosciences, and publications on challenges to established interpretations of morally significant concepts such as autonomy, responsibility, and human nature.
This subject category or topic prototype has strong connections to the subject categories or topic prototypes Neuroimaging, Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, and Social and Economic Neuroscience, and weak connections to the subject categories or topic prototypes Addiction, Brain Death and Severe Disorders of Consciousness, Brain Stimulation, Enhancement, Legal Studies, (Medical) Research and Medicine, Molecular Neurobiology and Genetics, Neuroscience and Society, Neurosurgery, Psychiatric and Neurodegenerative Diseases and Disorders, and Psychopharmacology. The strong connections can be explained by a high number of shared publications, that is, a high number of publications that can be assimilated to both the subject category or topic prototype Moral Theory and the subject category or topic prototype Neuroimaging, Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, or Social and Economic Neuroscience. The weak connections can be explained by a low number of shared publications, that is, a low number of publications that can be assimilated to both the subject category or topic prototype Moral Theory and the subject category or topic prototype Addiction, Brain Death and Severe Disorders of Consciousness, Brain Stimulation, Enhancement, Legal Studies, (Medical) Research and Medicine, Molecular Neurobiology and Genetics, Neuroscience and Society, Neurosurgery, Psychiatric and Neurodegenerative Diseases and Disorders, or Psychopharmacology (Hildt et al. forthcoming).
In the following, I analyze my results. I thereby attempt to achieve the second part of my epistemic goal, which is to reveal the degrees of relevance of Churchland’s publication to neuroethical research; as well as my argumentative goal, which is to demonstrate that applied metascience of NE can optimize NE itself and, hence, improve our pursuit of moral understanding.