NE, as a combination of applied ethics[5] and neurophilosophy[6] (Hildt 2012, p. 11), is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of neuroscience, medicine, and philosophy that deals with philosophical, ethical, anthropological, and socio-cultural issues related to neuroscience (Metzinger 2012, p. 36). In 2002, this versatile field emerged in the wake of several US-American conferences that were products of the Zeitgeist, that is, the Decade of the Brain from 1990 to 1999 (Hildt 2012, p. 9). In particular, it is common to identify the dawn of NE with a conference that was held in San Francisco on May 13th and 14th, 2002: Neuroethics: Mapping the Field (Marcus 2002). Before this, “most people saw no need for any such field” (Levy 2007, p. 1), but the aforementioned issues came to be perceived as far more important at this time. Nevertheless, we should ask: what exactly is NE? Alongside the first approximation given above, I present three typical examples of contemporary top-down approaches to NE (which I don’t claim to be exhaustive).
From a knowledge-driven perspective (Racine 2008, p. 33), Roskies divides NE into two divisions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. According to Levy, the former “seeks to develop an ethical framework for regulating the conduct of neuroscientific enquiry and the application of neuroscientific knowledge to human beings […] [whereas the latter studies] the impact of neuroscientific knowledge upon our understanding of ethics itself” (Levy 2007, p. 1). Furthermore:
the ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided into […] (1) the ethical issues and considerations that should be raised in the course of designing and executing neuroscientific studies and (2) evaluation of the ethical and social impact that the results of those studies might have, or ought to have, on existing social, ethical, and legal structures. (Roskies 2002, p. 21)
This top-down approach to NE emphasizes the philosophical challenges posed by neuroscience (Racine 2008, p. 34), for example, for “philosophical notions such as free-will, self-control, personal identity, and intention” (Roskies 2002, p. 22).
From a technology-driven perspective (Racine 2008, p. 33), Wolpe identifies NE with “both research and clinical applications of neurotechnology, as well as social and policy issues attendant to their use. […] [Thus, it is] a content field, defined by the technologies it examines rather than any particular philosophical approach” (Wolpe 2004, p. 1894). This top-down approach to NE emphasizes the ethical challenges of using neurotechnology (Racine 2008, p. 33), for example, in healthcare and social practices (Racine 2008, p. 32).
From a healthcare-driven perspective (Racine 2008, p. 33), Racine & Illes (2008) propose a definition of NE that “profiles the field as at the intersection of neuroscience and bioethics defined by a general practical goal, that of improving patient care for specific patient populations” (Racine 2008, p. 34). This top-down approach to NE emphasizes the field as “both a scholarly and practical endeavor, akin to medicine, which attempts to understand and intervene” (Racine 2008, p. 34).
In sum, each of the three top-down approaches to NE comprises (despite their convergences) different issues in different subject categories or topic prototypes with different relations to each other. Seemingly, there are as many top-down approaches to NE as philosophers in the field (e.g., Farah 2012[7]; Gazzaniga 2005;[8] Giordano n. d.;[9] Moreno 2003;[10] Safire 2007[11]) but probably even more.[12]
This unsystematic versatility is disadvantageous for any attempt at a precise localization of Churchland’s publication within the field because it suggests that the aforementioned top-down approaches to NE are necessarily incomplete or even inconsistent. Hence, their application can lead to unsatisfactory results—for example, a localization of the publication that depends more on a research agenda than on facts.[13] The bottom-up approach to NE attempts to provide a solution to this problem.