<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><ncx version="2005-1" xmlns="http://www.daisy.org/z3986/2005/ncx/"><head><meta content="978-3-95857-116-7" name="dtb:uid"/><meta content="-1" name="dtb:depth"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:totalPageCount"/><meta content="0" name="dtb:maxPageNumber"/></head><docTitle><text>A Multiplicity View for Social Cognition: Defending a Coherent Framework - A Reply to Lisa Quadt</text></docTitle><navMap><navPoint id="pt01html" playOrder="1"><navLabel><text>1 Introduction</text></navLabel><content src="pt01.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt02html" playOrder="2"><navLabel><text>2 Am I committed to an incoherent metaphysics?</text></navLabel><content src="pt02.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt03html" playOrder="3"><navLabel><text>3 Defending direct perception in an alternative metaphysical framework</text></navLabel><content src="pt03.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt04html" playOrder="4"><navLabel><text>4  Quadt’s proposal FOR an alternative metaphysical framework</text></navLabel><content src="pt04.html"/></navPoint><navPoint id="pt05html" playOrder="5"><navLabel><text>5 Self-models and person models: how are they related?</text></navLabel><content src="pt05.html"/></navPoint></navMap></ncx>