Although I think I do not need an alternative metaphysics, since I have a coherent one already, I would like to briefly comment on Quadt’s account. She starts with a remark on embodiment. I do not really see any serious disagreement with my views here. For it is fine by me that phenomenal properties and mental representations in general are realized within the body —and sometimes not only in the brain but within our whole body (see the discussion of emotions). Furthermore, I said that in this reply I leave open whether we need an extended realization basis for some mental representations. Quadt’s alternative proposal, with which she aims to deliver a new framework for a multiplicity view, introduces different levels of embodiment. One way to read her distinction is that it offers a characterization of different types of representation that unfold during ontogeny. This basic idea is entirely consistent with my work. In other papers I discuss in detail the development of different types of representation in ontogeny (Newen & Vogeley 2003; Newen & Fiebich 2009; de Bruin & Newen 2012). There are of course differences in how one might form types of representation but discussion of these goes beyond the scope of this reply.
Let me now elaborate on an important point of disagreement. Quadt’s proposal is based, among other things, on the distinction between transparent and opaque ways of being involved in a mental state. She takes this distinction from Metzinger (2003, 2004). We can illustrate this distinction using the example of the mental event of perceiving an apple. This event is transparent if I am only consciously aware of the apple, while it is opaque if I am (also) aware of my mental state of seeing the apple: “[w]hat distinguishes transparent from opaque states is the degree to which one’s own social cognitive processing, which is directed at the other person, is explicitly represented as a process” (Quadt 2015, p. 12). The relevant move is Quadt’s claim that the epistemic access of direct perception in social cognition can be explained by transparency, while the epistemic access of simulation and theory-based inference can be explained by opacity.
Here I think she is on the wrong track. This distinction between transparency and opacity in the case of a mental state of attributing a belief leads to the idea that I am not only aware of the other person having a belief with content p but that I am also focussing on being consciously aware of the process of my attributing a belief to the other. The latter can of course happen in case of reflective processes of attributing beliefs; but normally we are in a mode of just using our ability to attribute beliefs automatically, focusing on the other’s belief and its content (not on our own process of attributing it). We normally deal with our mental state of attributing beliefs in a transparent way, contrary to the analysis offered by Quadt. Furthermore, direct perception can also be used opaquely in rare cases of being reflectively aware of guiding images: if I am an experienced chess player, I can perceive the chess board in a way that is best described by cognitive penetration, and in some cases I may be aware of the mental image which guides my perception, i.e. I see a position and know how to act because I consciously memorize the fact that I see exactly the same position I saw in a previously played game. Thus, the distinction between transparency and opacity is not helpful for characterizing the different strategies of epistemic access to another’s mental states.