%0 Book Section %A Block, Ned %D 2015 %T Solely Generic Phenomenology %E Metzinger, Thomas K. %E Windt, Jennifer M. %B Open MIND %C Frankfurt am Main %I MIND Group %& 5(R) %! Solely Generic Phenomenology %@ 9783958571150 %R 10.15502/9783958571150 %X If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink argues that there is a danger of trivialization of phenomenal precision and that the one way out may be incompatible with my view that consciousness overflows cognition. I try to say more about how to clarify phenomenal precision and its relation to my views on overflow. %K Generic, Phenomenal precision, Phenomenology, Solely generic phenomenology, Specific %U https://open-mind.net/papers/solely-generic-phenomenology-a-reply-to-sascha-b-fink %G English