TY - CHAP A2 - Metzinger, Thomas K. A2 - Windt, Jennifer M. AB - Tobias Schlicht argues that subjective character derives from the integration of mental states into a complex of representations of the organism and that therefore there is no need try to account for subjective character in terms of “reflexivity” or self-acquaintance, as I do. He further argues that the proper subject of consciousness is the whole organism and not the episode or stream of consciousness, as I maintain. He maintains that his account solves problems about the individuation and synchronic unity of conscious mental states that mine does not. While I agree that we need an account of the individuation of episodes of consciousness and an account of the synchronic and diachronic unities of consciousness (something I bracketed in my paper), I disagree that making the organism into the phenomenological subject of consciousness helps with these problems. However, I am willing to concede that the organism is the subject of consciousness in some non-phenomenological sense. AU - Williford, Kenneth CY - Frankfurt am Main DO - 10.15502/9783958570771 KW - Conscious vs. unconscious mental states, Individuation, Integration, Organism, Phenomenological subject, Reflexivity, Self-acquaintance, Unity of consciousness LA - English PB - MIND Group PY - 2015 SE - 39(R) SN - 9783958570771 ST - Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject T2 - Open MIND TI - Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject UR - https://open-mind.net/papers/individuation-integration-and-the-phenomenological-subject2014a-reply-to-tobias-schlicht ID - 39