@incollection{Williford.2015, abstract = {Tobias Schlicht argues that subjective character derives from the integration of mental states into a complex of representations of the organism and that therefore there is no need try to account for subjective character in terms of “reflexivity” or self-acquaintance, as I do. He further argues that the proper subject of consciousness is the whole organism and not the episode or stream of consciousness, as I maintain. He maintains that his account solves problems about the individuation and synchronic unity of conscious mental states that mine does not. While I agree that we need an account of the individuation of episodes of consciousness and an account of the synchronic and diachronic unities of consciousness (something I bracketed in my paper), I disagree that making the organism into the phenomenological subject of consciousness helps with these problems. However, I am willing to concede that the organism is the subject of consciousness in some non-phenomenological sense.}, author={Williford, Kenneth}, title = {Individuation, Integration, and the Phenomenological Subject}, url = {https://open-mind.net/papers/individuation-integration-and-the-phenomenological-subject2014a-reply-to-tobias-schlicht}, keywords = {Conscious vs. unconscious mental states, Individuation, Integration, Organism, Phenomenological subject, Reflexivity, Self-acquaintance, Unity of consciousness}, publisher = {MIND Group}, isbn = {9783958570771}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas K. and Windt, Jennifer M.}, booktitle = {Open MIND}, chapter = {39(R)}, year = {2015}, address = {Frankfurt am Main}, doi = {10.15502/9783958570771}}