@incollection{O’Brien.2015, abstract = {The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a solution to one version of the problem of mental causation. The version under examination is the content causation problem: that of explaining how the specifically representational properties of mental phenomena can be causally efficacious of behaviour. I contend that the apparent insolubility of the content causation problem is a legacy of the dyadic conception of representation, which has conditioned philosophical intuitions, but provides little guidance about the relational character of mental content. I argue that a triadic conception of representation yields a more illuminating account of mental content and, in so doing, reveals a candidate solution to the content causation problem. This solution requires the rehabilitation of an approach to mental content determination that is unpopular in contemporary philosophy. But this approach, I conclude, seems mandatory if we are to explain why mental content matters.}, author={O’Brien, Gerard}, title = {How Does Mind Matter? - Solving the Content Causation Problem}, url = {https://open-mind.net/papers/how-does-mind-matter-solving-the-content-causation-problem}, keywords = {Content determination, Mental causation, Mental representation, Resemblance}, publisher = {MIND Group}, isbn = {9783958570146}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas K. and Windt, Jennifer M.}, booktitle = {Open MIND}, chapter = {28(T)}, year = {2015}, address = {Frankfurt am Main}, doi = {10.15502/9783958570146}}