%0 Book Section %A Noë, Alva %D 2015 %T Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence %E Metzinger, Thomas K. %E Windt, Jennifer M. %B Open MIND %C Frankfurt am Main %I MIND Group %& 27(T) %! Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence %@ 9783958570597 %R 10.15502/9783958570597 %X This paper has three main aims. First, I criticize intellectualism in the philosophy of mind and I outline an alternative to intellectualism that I call Concept Pluralism. Second, I seek to unify the sensorimotor or enactive approach to perception and perceptual consciousness developed in O’Regan & Noë (2001) and Noë (2004, 2012), with an account of understanding concepts. The proposal here —that concepts and sensorimotor skills are species of a common genus, that they are kinds of skills of access —is meant to offer an extension of the earlier account of perception. Finally, I describe a phenomenon —fragility —that has been poorly understood, but whose correct analysis is critical for progress in the theory of mind (both perception and cognition). %K Actionism, Concept pluralism, Concepts, Consciousness, Enactive account, Evans, Fragility, Frege, Intellectualism, Kant, Perception, Plato, Presence, Sensorimotor account, The intellectualist insight, The intellectualist thesis, Understanding, Wittgenstein %U https://open-mind.net/papers/concept-pluralism-direct-perception-and-the-fragility-of-presence %G English