TY - CHAP A2 - Metzinger, Thomas K. A2 - Windt, Jennifer M. AB - Lisa Quadt’s commentary focuses on my theory about the multiple epistemic strategies humans use to receive information about one other’s mental phenomena. She develops a principle worry about the theory’s underlying metaphysical foundations, arguing that I am committed to an incoherent metaphysical framework. In this reply, I show that I am not committed to the position she attributes to me and I outline an alternative framework that is my actual background view. I illustrate this framework by discussing emotions and argue that emotions are individuated as integrated patterns of characteristic features. This enables me to combine a representational account of emotions with a theory of direct perception of basic emotions as well as with an understanding of some emotions relying on theory-based inferences. Thus, I have a coherent metaphysics. Finally, I show that the alternative suggested by Quadt has its own problems. AU - Newen, Albert CY - Frankfurt am Main DO - 10.15502/9783958571167 KW - Direct perception, Metaphysical foundation, Person model theory, Social cognition, Transparency LA - English PB - MIND Group PY - 2015 SE - 26(R) SN - 9783958571167 ST - A Multiplicity View for Social Cognition: Defending a Coherent Framework T2 - Open MIND TI - A Multiplicity View for Social Cognition: Defending a Coherent Framework UR - https://open-mind.net/papers/a-multiplicity-view-for-social-cognition-defending-a-coherent-framework-a-reply-to-lisa-quadt ID - 26