After answering several possible challenges to my arguments against the default view (see Section 1 of her commentary), Windt shows that the Indian philosophical debate (in which the Yoga and Vedānta schools argue that consciousness persists throughout dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school denies this claim) parallels in certain key respects the Western philosophical and scientific debates about the trustworthiness of dream reports. Given that sleep science must assume as a methodological criterion of dream research that retrospective reports of dreaming and nondreaming are trustworthy (given ideal reporting conditions), we must similarly assume that retrospective reports of the presence or the absence of experience in dreamless sleep are also trustworthy (again, given ideal reporting conditions). This requirement in turn implies that we must refine the conceptual typology of retrospective reports upon awakening from sleep. In Windt’s (2015b, p. 11) words, “reports of nondreaming should be further qualified: reporting the absence of experience is not the same as reporting dreamless sleep experience. The former is an instance of reporting an absence of experience, the latter is an instance of reporting a form of experience characterized by the absence of intentional objects; but it is still an experience report.” I will not review the steps of her analysis of the methodological requirements of sleep and dream science in detail (see Section 2 of her commentary), but the upshot is that the default view turns out to be inconsistent with the methodological background assumptions of scientific sleep and dream research. This conclusion strengthens the case against the default view, for whereas I argue that this view is likely to be empirically false, Windt shows that it is inconsistent with the methodological requirements for scientifically investigating the presence and absence of consciousness in sleep.